We in the West have learned many things from the conflict in Ukraine. Four years on from its full-scale invasion — the war in fact having started in 2014 — we find ourselves, or should find ourselves, with a far better grasp of the nature of war, and a far greater sense of the dangers we face. That is reflected most visibly in promises across Western Europe to increase defense spending. But what is the concrete impact of this? As many commentators have said, it’s not just what you spend, but how you spend; and the brutal reality is that even with generous and sustained investment, it takes years to create the kind of defense ecosystem that creates real deterrence.
Ukraine has made crystal clear something else — something that readers of SpaceNews will probably know already, defense depends on space. The efficacy of drones, the functioning of artillery, the movement of units on the ground — all of these work optimally when space systems (specifically, Position, Navigation and Timing) are online and operating seamlessly; they start to break down rapidly when they aren’t. No wonder, then, that modern militaries seek to disrupt or disable the satellites that coordinate forces on the ground.
In Britain, though we have promised to raise defense spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, added 2.2 billion pounds for 2025–26 and speak (in last year’s Strategic Defense Review) of “warfighting readiness,” we are not where we need to be in respect of space resilience. Much of our architecture remains relatively fragile. A small number of systems carry the bulk of the load, and many still depend on constant human control from the ground. Those links, in the case of a conflict, will be degraded or denied. And that will affect those that rely on them in ways that, under strain, are difficult to recover from.
What should happen? First, proliferate crucial elements in the system so that if one fails, the whole system does not break down. In other words, pursue redundancy. Share vital tasks across the fleet, as in air and maritime operations, so that any adversaries cannot disrupt the whole network simply by taking out one or a small number of spacecraft.
Secondly, improve awareness. Attribution is a thorny problem in space. Often, it isn’t clear what is happening and who is responsible. If a spacecraft ceases to work as it should, then establishing why and who, if anyone, is behind it, should not be a guessing game. That can lead to over-reactions and escalations or, on the other hand, paralysis or no response at all. Practically speaking, space domain awareness requires that spacecraft can collect data and respond by themselves. It’s unrealistic to expect a human operator to oversee things round the clock and to be able to respond to events that move extremely quickly. We need autonomous systems.
This isn’t what we’re seeing — not yet. There is far more talk of space, and a growing appreciation of our vulnerabilities. But in terms of how our systems are built and bought, there is some way to go. The truth is that the space architecture we have at the moment is based on an outdated worldview — one in which space is a more-or-less peaceful domain, held in common even by countries with rivalries here on Earth. That has left us exposed to countries that, according to senior figures in defense and space, are tracking and jamming our own assets constantly.
Solving this problem is beyond the scope of a single article. But, the way forward will require procurement reform, a richer and deeper understanding of the precise problems that need solving, much greater urgency and, put simply, everything aimed towards a situation in which there are more systems, working together, designed from the outset to keep working through disruption rather than assuming disruption can be avoided. The systems we need must spread risk out, adapt quickly to changing circumstances, and carry on working when parts of them fail. That will allow forces on the ground to do what they do best, as best they can.
This is inconvenient. There is an established way of doing things in defense, and this isn’t it. But space is the nervous system of our armed forces, and that system is harmed then however strong the limbs may be, they will not work well. Space is not an adjunct; a nice-to-have. It is essential warfighting infrastructure. It must be treated as such.
Graeme Ritchie is CEO of Shield Space.
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