Recent analysis by Reeves in the Mitchell Institute’s “Charting a Path to Space Superiority: The Cross-Domain Imperative” identifies the need for centralized command and control (C2) of counterspace capabilities under U.S. Space Command to ensure unity of effort. However, Reeves’s critique of the United States Army’s development of counterspace capabilities fundamentally misunderstands the Army’s role within the joint force structure. The paper mischaracterizes the Army’s efforts as building a mini-space force and perpetuates the false narrative that the Army independently commands and controls its counterspace systems. In reality, the Army operates precisely within the joint C2 framework that Reeves advocates for, presenting forces to combatant commands that derive their authorities directly from the President through the Unified Command Plan.
Legal foundations and service responsibilities
The Army’s role is not to duplicate the Space Force; it is to fulfill its foundational functions as prescribed by federal law. Title 10, U.S. Code, legally mandates each service to “organize, train, and equip” its forces for missions assigned by the combatant commands. Specifically, Section 7062 provides the direct and unambiguous legal basis for the Army’s composition and functions, establishing the primary statutory source for the service’s core institutional purpose. Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 implements this statutory framework, translating Title 10 authorities into specific service functions. A careful examination of this directive reveals that military service functions are inherently multidomain.
The directive specifies that the Army must “interdict enemy sea, space, air power, and communications through operations on or from the land.” Yet this single line must be understood within its fuller context. Scholars and practitioners who closely examine the roles and functions of the armed forces recognize that DoDD 5100.01 reflects the Joint Force’s fundamentally multidomain character. The Navy and Marine Corps are “composed of naval, land, air, space, and cyberspace forces… to include those organic forces and capabilities necessary to operate, and support the Navy and Marine Corps, the other Military Services, and joint forces.” The directive does not require services to operate exclusively within a single domain. Instead, it acknowledges that modern warfare requires all military services to operate across multiple domains simultaneously.
Consider the broader context: the Air Force maintains watercraft to support its service-unique requirements, the Navy operates land-based installations and aircraft, and the Marine Corps employs aviation and cyberspace forces in integrated operations. These are not examples of domain encroachment but rather recognition that domain boundaries cannot constrain effective military operations. The directive’s language for each service reflects this multidomain reality. No service can accomplish its mission while remaining confined to a single domain, nor should artificial restrictions prevent services from developing capabilities essential to their core functions.
The Army cannot operate solely on the ground, nor can any other service operate within a specific domain in isolation. Army weapon systems routinely operate across the air domain, and the Army is not precluded from countering adversary air capabilities when necessary for force protection and mission accomplishment. Similarly, all services operate on and project forces from the land domain through land-based installations. The multidomain nature of DoDD 5100.01 is not a coincidence but a deliberate recognition that domain integration is essential to joint warfighting effectiveness.
Understanding this framework requires examining the evolution of military organization. The National Security Act of 1947 established the modern Department of Defense and the United States Air Force, creating the original legal framework for service roles and missions. This structure remained essentially unchanged until the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which clarified the chain of command by empowering combatant commanders with operational control while cementing service chiefs’ roles in organizing, training, and equipping forces. This historical development supports the central argument: the Army, by preparing and presenting space forces to the joint force, operates within the modern, statutorily defined C2 framework established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
The path to unified command
The principle of unified command is not merely a lesson from history but a doctrinal imperative codified in joint doctrine. Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfighting (2023) and the Joint Force (2020) offer a comprehensive overview of joint doctrine that reinforces this principle, stating that the military functions through unified action in which services provide ready forces and combatant commands employ them. These publications authoritatively define the complementary roles of the services and combatant commands, providing a doctrinal foundation for the principle that the Army’s role is to provide capabilities, not to dictate their ultimate operational employment. This demonstrates that the Army’s approach aligns with the current joint doctrine.
This clear separation of functions constitutes the bedrock of the U.S. military and is the exact model the Army follows today. Army forces, such as the Multidomain Task Forces (MDTFs) and 1st Space Brigade, are organized, trained, and equipped by the Army and then presented to the Joint Force through the Global Force Management or theater assignment process. Once assigned to combatant commands, these forces derive their counterspace authorities from both regional combatant commands and U.S. Space Command in support of named operations and operational plans. The Army relinquishes operational control of these forces upon assignment to combatant commanders.
The imperative to integrate
The very nature of modern warfare demands deep integration, not the segregation of capabilities by domain or service. As then-Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein warned in 2019, “If you’re saying the words ‘separate’ and ‘space’ in the same sentence, you’re moving in the wrong direction. Now is not the time to build seams and segregate.” Any position suggesting that services outside the Space Force should not possess space capabilities would create the exact dangerous “seam” that General Goldfein cautioned against, divorcing land forces from capabilities essential for their survival and success.
The Army’s approach embraces the integration that senior leaders demand. By developing and embedding space forces and capabilities within its formations, the Army ensures that space is not a separate seam or a detached domain but an integral part of combined-arms maneuver. This is not a matter of tactical versus strategic differentiation, but rather how each service contributes unique capabilities to support the joint force, based on service-specific operational requirements.
Just as Army aviation focuses on close air support and intra-theater mobility rather than achieving air superiority, Army counterspace capabilities are purpose-built to support ground maneuver commanders with expeditionary systems co-located with forces at the tactical edge of battle. The Army’s primary warfighting mission is land superiority, while the Space Force’s primary warfighting mission is space superiority. Each service contributes unique capabilities tailored to its operational domain, creating complementary rather than competing missions.
Complementary roles and joint coordination
The principle of complementary roles is foundational to the joint force, famously described by Eisenhower as a “three-legged stool” where each service is mutually dependent. The Army’s investment in counterspace, directed by the Secretary of Defense, fills a specific, complementary role by providing tactical effects in support of ground maneuver. As then-Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson noted in her 2019 opposition to creating new organizational boxes, “If I had more money, I would put it into lethality, not bureaucracy.” The Army’s approach does exactly that. It adds lethality through agile, scalable counterspace capabilities delivered directly to the warfighter, enhancing the joint force’s effectiveness without creating redundant and costly organizational layers.
Understanding the Army’s approach requires recognizing that these forces do not conduct independent operations. This point merits emphasis: Army counterspace units operate under the command and control of joint force commanders who coordinate and synchronize their employment in support of combatant command objectives. Gen. Stephen Whiting, Commander of U.S. Space Command, directly addressed this integration in response to critiques of Army space initiatives, stating that “space expertise does not have to be exclusive to the Space Force” and emphasizing that the expertise of the Army and other services is “absolutely vital” to military operations in the space domain. Whiting further clarified the combatant commander’s operational perspective: “As a combatant commander, I want capabilities.” This statement underscores that operational effectiveness depends on capabilities that deliver effects, not organizational structures and overhead that constrain them.
This integration approach manifests in operational practice. Army counterspace capabilities are integrated into combatant command operational plans, synchronized with broader Space Force operations through U.S. Space Command, and employed in concert with capabilities from all services. Gen. Whiting further explained this integration, noting that U.S. Space Command benefits from blending “space expertise with what the other Services bring us,” describing this as “the secret sauce at U.S. Space Command.” The Army does not develop counterspace doctrine in isolation; rather, it contributes to joint doctrine development through established processes. This collaborative approach ensures that Army counterspace capabilities enhance rather than complicate joint operations. The combatant commanders, not the Army, determine when, where, and how these capabilities are employed, maintaining the principle of unified command that has been the bedrock of American military effectiveness since World War II.
Conclusion
The friction surrounding the Army’s role in space echoes the interservice battles of the late 1940s, such as the “Revolt of the Admirals.” The formative debates over service roles and missions are detailed in Condit’s official history of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His work, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: Vol. 2. 1947-1949, provides an authoritative account of the negotiations and rivalries that shaped the post-World War II military, supplementing our understanding of the Key West and Newport conferences. Rearden offers a historical perspective: the evolution of the joint force has always been characterized by rigorous debate and, eventually, resolution through the clear delineation of complementary roles.
The Army is not acting unilaterally; it is an active and essential participant in joint space operations, adhering to the functions prescribed in Title 10, U.S. Code, and implementing them through DoDD 5100.01. The Army is not creating a mini-space force, nor does it seek to do so. The key is understanding the history of the roles and functions of the Armed Forces and why the military operates as it does. The Army is complementary to the Space Force, not competing with it. The Army embraces the fluidity of modern multidomain operations and works in tandem with the Space Force and other joint partners to contribute essential capabilities to the joint force.
The Army fulfills a statutory requirement to provide unique, purpose-built capabilities fully integrated into joint operations. These forces are, and will continue to be, employed under the authority and C2 of U.S. Space Command and other combatant commanders, ensuring a unified, multidomain fight that leverages the complementary strengths of all services. This approach does not undermine the Space Force; it enhances joint force effectiveness by ensuring that space capabilities are organically integrated across all echelons of military operations, from tactical to strategic, in defense of the nation.
Col. Pete Atkinson is a principal space advisor at the headquarters of the Department of the Army, and a public administration and policy doctoral student at Old Dominion University.
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