Europe is rapidly rewriting its security architecture. Faced with Russian aggression, mounting doubts about long-term American commitment and growing pressure to shoulder more of its own defense burden, European states have embraced minilateralism: smaller, flexible coalitions built around shared strategic priorities and operational needs. From the Joint Expeditionary Force to the Anglo-German Kensington Treaty and France’s new concept of “forward deterrence”, these coalitions are reshaping how Europe prepares for conflict. And yet space, increasingly central to military operations and deterrence, remains the missing piece.
While European countries are deepening defense cooperation across land, air and maritime domains, they continue to rely overwhelmingly on the United States for military space operations. Europe has made progress in developing shared space infrastructure and services, but its approach to operational space power remains fragmented, nationally driven and heavily dependent on U.S. leadership. If Europe wants credible strategic autonomy in defence, it must begin operationalizing minilateral cooperation in space as well.
That is not to say Europe is ignoring the issue entirely. The European Union is developing the IRIS² secure communications constellation and funding the initial phases of a European space-based early warning architecture through the ODIN’s EYE program, recently reinforced by the Franco-German JEWEL initiative. The European Space Agency has also entered the defense arena through its European Resilience from Space program, designed to integrate Earth observation, satellite communications and positioning, navigation and timing into a system-of-systems approach for dual-use missions. NATO, for its part, has launched a series of space initiatives such as the Strategic Space Situational Awareness System, Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space, and NORTHLINK. These initiatives are based on a pooling-and-sharing model of existing capabilities drawn from a select number of NATO countries.
This illustrates how European countries, often working in smaller groups, are collaborating to develop a diverse range of capabilities and services that support the broader enabling role of space, rather than the operational conduct of space warfare itself.
That distinction matters. In other domains, European states are increasingly developing structures capable not only of supporting military operations, but of conducting them collectively. In space, by contrast, Europe still lacks the operational mechanisms and integrated command structures needed to compete, deter and, if necessary, fight in a contested orbital environment.
European counterspace operations: fragmentation and dependence on the U.S.
The gap is particularly visible in space domain awareness and counterspace operations. Fifteen European countries contribute sensors, operational centres, and personnel to the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) system. But the system’s mandate remains civil in nature, focused on collision avoidance and space debris monitoring. Building a recognized space picture capable of tracking adversary satellites in real time remains the national prerogative of EU member states. In practice, European countries continue to rely heavily on data from the U.S. Space Force’s 18th Space Defense Squadron for military space domain awareness. Europe can catalogue objects in orbit, but it cannot yet autonomously generate operationally relevant space intelligence at the speed modern conflict requires.
Recognizing this limitation, several European powers are developing national counterspace capabilities. The UK plans to deploy co-orbital and Earth-based counterspace capabilities, although a timeline is yet to be defined. Germany will develop directed energy weapons and other non-kinetic systems to target assets across all space segments as part of the 35 billion pound ($47 billion) spending commitment for defence space capabilities. France expects to have the ability to inspect and counter threats in low Earth orbit by 2027. These national plans do not seem to be the result of joint planning among European allies, risking unintended duplication and further fragmentation in the European market.
Operationally, the irony is striking. Even as European countries pursue greater defence autonomy elsewhere, their most advanced space cooperation continues to occur within U.S.-led frameworks such as Operation Olympic Defender and the Combined Space Operations initiative. In the former, France, Germany, and the UK are developing orbital warfare concepts of operations alongside the U.S., while recent bilateral rendezvous and proximity operations with U.S. forces have demonstrated the ability to defend European high-value orbital assets.
Operationalizing Europe’s minilateral cooperation for counterspace
It is surprising that, while European countries have tightened cooperation in other domains to strengthen transatlantic burden-sharing and hedge against reduced U.S. engagement in European defense, they have not developed dedicated European structures for space operations. Instead, France, Germany and the UK continue to rely on the U.S. as a space coordinating authority.
This is not to argue against continued participation in Operation Olympic Defender. Cooperation with the U.S. in planning, exercises and operations remains a major advantage, and replicating such structures at the European level would take years, if not decades.
Instead, European powers should build a distinct European pillar within existing minilateral frameworks. Anchored in transatlantic space cooperation, a stronger European pillar would actively benefit the U.S. The most recent exercise under Operation Olympic Defender is a step in the right direction. During Operation Selene, it was Canada that led a multinational effort to track a high-value orbital target using allied space domain awareness capabilities. European states could lead similar exercises themselves, with the U.S. serving only as a supporting asset. Such exercises could include both defensive and offensive counterspace scenarios involving European-owned assets.
This would represent a pragmatic first step toward European strategic autonomy in space. Key European countries have long accepted a degree of specialization in space capabilities. France and Germany have had bilateral agreements in place to develop optical and synthetic aperture radar satellite capabilities, respectively, exchanging tasking rights to each other’s constellations. France and Italy have pursued similar arrangements.
A comparable approach could emerge for counterspace systems. The UK, France, Germany and other relevant European countries could identify technology areas for which they have national competitive advantage and specialize accordingly. For example, one country could focus on directed energy weapons and another on mechanisms to capture non-cooperative spacecraft. Although this model qualifies national sovereignty, it aligns with the growing trend towards European minilateral cooperation and is a realistic option given the urgent need to offer a European dimension to counterspace operations.
Although Russia may have refrained from conducting escalatory activities in space during the war in Ukraine, this behavior is consistent with its doctrine. A war with wider Europe would most likely witness a different risk appetite on Russia’s part. Leading European space powers should continue working with the U.S. and pursue independent initiatives at the European level to better compete in space.
Aleix Nadal is an analyst at RAND Europe Space Hub.
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