We are in the geospatial era of warfare in which information derived from satellites is as strategically critical as territorial control. The progressive dissolution of the distinction between the civil and military domains, made possible by commercial and dual-use space systems, has turned visibility into a weapon of war. This transformation is playing out in the current United States-Iran conflict through two developments: the reports of Iran using Chinese-connected commercial satellite systems (Earth Eye Co and Emposat networks) to produce intelligence on U.S. assets, and the constraining of satellite imagery over Iran and other war zones by Planet Labs at the behest of the state.
In tandem, these events presage a systemic shift in warfare. Alongside technological developments is a new structural transformation of warfare: geospatial and dual-use technological ecosystems are increasingly integral to the conduct of war, blurring traditional boundaries between counterforce and counter value targets.
The most immediate expression of this shift is the changing role of satellite-derived intelligence in conflict. High-resolution Earth observation, once monopolized by states, is now produced and distributed through commercial constellations capable of tracking deployments, assessing strike damage and enabling operational planning in near real time. As a result, intelligence that once resided exclusively within classified systems is now partially embedded in commercial markets.
In the current U.S.-Iran confrontation, this has produced a dual transformation. On one hand, the restriction of Planet Labs imagery over Iran reflects the emergence of a digital blockade, which is an attempt to control visibility. By limiting what can be seen, states are no longer simply managing information; they are also shaping the conditions under which information can exist at all. This produces a strategic asymmetry of perception, where visibility becomes selectively distributed and politically conditioned. On the other hand, Iran’s reported use of foreign commercial satellite infrastructure demonstrates the operational value of this same system. By leveraging Earth observation capabilities and third-party ground networks, states can bypass traditional intelligence constraints and access targeting-relevant geospatial data through commercial channels. This effectively represents the outsourcing of the kill chain (the sequence from detection to targeting to strike execution) into a distributed global ecosystem of private firms, foreign infrastructure and state operators.
Consequences of embedding spatial infrastructure into warfare
Since the start of the conflict, Iran has proven highly effective in its ability to target U.S. military assets in the Middle East region, notwithstanding advanced American air and missile defense systems. In retaliation for joint Israeli and American actions, Iranian forces undertook saturation bombing campaigns across several bases across the region, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Such attacks had a demonstrable impact. Preliminary estimates suggest Iranian attacks caused roughly $800 million in damage to U.S. installations in the first two weeks of the conflict, with significant effects on air defense and satellite communications assets — systems that are tied to geospatial intelligence and command-and-control capabilities. Iran was also able to target and re-target critical facilities such as Al-Udeid (Qatar), Ali Al-Salim (Kuwait) and Prince Sultan Air Base (Saudi Arabia), indicating not just range but endurance against a dispersed network of defenses.
More notably, Iran was able to successfully target high-value targets including elements of THAAD missile defense and AN/TPY-2 radars in Jordan and the UAE, as well as aircraft assets including E-3 Sentry surveillance and KC-135 tanker aircraft. These are key to U.S. intelligence gathering and airlift capacity in the region.
The scope of these operations also reflects this new environment of warfare. Through the launch of more than 5,400 drones and missiles in a single month, Iran employed a saturation approach to overwhelm and exploit cost differences. In many instances, relatively inexpensive systems compelled the U.S. to spend far more on interceptors to counter them, generating a cost disparity in defense. Enter geospatial warfare. Iran’s campaign has been effective not only because of the strength of its firepower, but because of its capacity to disrupt a highly interconnected and data-intensive military system. U.S. power projection in the region is heavily reliant on integrated sensor networks, satellite-connected communications and distributed bases, all of which require the uninterrupted flow of data and geospatial intelligence. Attacking these nodes has a greater impact than the actual scale of the assault.
In this sense, the Iran case demonstrates a broader truth: Control over data-rich infrastructure now translates directly into operational advantage on the battlefield.
Yet this transformation is not confined to the Middle East. The Russia–Ukraine war has already illustrated how deeply modern warfare depends on commercial and dual-use space systems. Ukraine’s reliance on private satellite imagery has significantly enhanced its battlefield awareness; Meanwhile Chinese-Russian cooperation in satellite navigation systems further reinforces this pattern. The integration of Beidou and GLONASS alongside shared ground infrastructure enhances interoperability between civilian and military applications, improving timing precision, communication reliability and operational coordination. Across these systems, civilian-labelled infrastructure increasingly functions as embedded military capability.
Taken together, these cases reveal a consistent pattern that modern warfare is no longer defined by territorial control alone, but by the ability to access, restrict and manipulate geospatial information across globally distributed networks. Dual-use technologies have become the connective tissue of this system.
Strategic implications
The strategic implications of geospatial warfare are profound. First, control over geospatial data has become a core determinant of military power. Geospatial intelligence is no longer a supporting function; it is now the connective tissue of modern deterrence, shaping the speed of the Observe–Orient–Decide–Act (OODA) loop. AI-driven systems such as Smart Geo AI can now process massive datasets from synthetic aperture radar and optical satellites in real time, automating change detection, threat identification and precision targeting. Accurate, persistent 3D geospatial data is essential not only for battlefield awareness but also for minimizing collateral damage in dense urban operations. This is why states are racing to develop sovereign satellite constellations such as Pakistan’s PRSC EO-3, recognizing that dependence on foreign commercial providers creates strategic vulnerability, as seen when Ukrainian access to certain U.S. commercial data was temporarily restricted in 2025.
Second, commercial space systems have created new vulnerabilities by pulling civilian infrastructure directly into contested military space. The democratization of space has made private operators active participants in war. Systems such as SpaceX’s Starlink, originally commercial communication platforms, now function as critical military infrastructure, making them legitimate targets for cyber intrusions, jamming, spoofing and other non-kinetic attacks. Recognizing this dependence, the U.S. Space Force is institutionalizing commercial integration through the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR), formally embedding private satellite capacity into defense planning.
Third, attribution and accountability have become increasingly diffuse. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance are no longer monopolized by states but distributed across commercial providers such as Maxar, Planet Labs and ICEYE. Commercial satellites now publicly expose troop buildups, as seen before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when satellite imagery revealed Russian convoy movements and undercut strategic surprise. At the same time, private companies can shape battlefield outcomes without being bound by the same legal obligations as states. Elon Musk’s decisions regarding Starlink access in Ukraine demonstrated how a civilian actor could directly affect wartime operations. This creates serious accountability gaps, where strategic decisions are influenced by actors outside formal military command structures.
Despite these implications, the integration of commercial space into warfare seems to be irreversible. Militaries are embedding these services directly into operational planning because the private sector innovates faster than governments can build sovereign alternatives. Starlink’s low-latency communications have become essential for Ukrainian drone operations and battlefield coordination, while the CASR framework shows how even the U.S. military now depends on commercial surge capacity during conflict. But most importantly, commercial geospatial systems have enabled weaker actors to offset traditional asymmetries in power. Ukraine has used commercial imagery to identify Russian artillery positions and logistical routes, while Iran has carried out precision-strikes by integrating commercial satellite navigation and foreign systems such as China’s BeiDou. Analysts report that Iranian Shahed drones now use commercial-grade navigation chips and anti-jamming technologies capable of striking specific buildings or radar systems with remarkable accuracy. This has also created a severe cost-exchange dilemma: Iran can deploy drones costing around $20,000 to force adversaries to use interceptor missiles that cost nearly $2 million each, economically exhausting stronger opponents.
The challenge, therefore, is not to halt this transformation but to understand and regulate its consequences.
Toward a governance architecture for geospatial warfare
The transformations described above demand more than strategic adaptation. There is a demand for institutional reform and regulation across three levels: the commercial sector, the state and the international order.
At the industry level, the first imperative is for commercial space actors to adopt pre-committed conflict ethics frameworks rather than relying on ad hoc decision-making. The cases of Starlink’s discretionary activation in Ukraine and opaque imagery gaps in Gaza demonstrate how case-by-case corporate decisions create inconsistency, erode public trust and invite political manipulation. A transparent, pre-defined framework would ensure predictability, protect operational neutrality and prevent the kind of selective data denial that can obscure atrocities and accountability on the ground.
Alongside this, companies must conduct rigorous dual-use audits to understand their position within the kill chain. The Iran–Earth Eye–Emposat case illustrates precisely how commercial systems can inadvertently provide find, fix, and track capabilities to sanctioned actors through API access and third-party routing. Without such audits, firms risk not only legal liability but loss of civilian protection status under the law of armed conflict, and direct moral complicity in enabling lethal strikes.
Critically, the industry must also move beyond binary shutdowns. Total imagery blackouts ultimately benefit aggressors by concealing evidence of destruction. There should be a tiered access model in place offering time-delayed or lower-resolution imagery. It would allow humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross or Amnesty International to document war crimes and track refugee movements, while denying the real-time precision required for the target and engage phases of the kill chain. This preserves the public witness function of satellite systems without feeding operational military cycles.
At the state level, two structural reforms are essential. First, governments must mandate the registration and disclosure of all dual-use contracts to close the shell company loophole. The Iran–Chinese satellite network case demonstrates how sanctioned actors can circumvent export controls by accessing commercial imagery through front companies posing as civilian clients. Effective regulation must extend beyond hardware to service-level access, including API keys, data subscriptions and ground station agreements, so that intelligence agencies can map the full digital supply chain and identify when seemingly benign contracts are enabling military targeting. Second, states must invest in sovereign and collectively owned geospatial capabilities to reduce overreliance on commercial providers. Pakistan’s PRSC EO-3 launch, alongside Europe’s IRIS² and GOVSATCOM initiatives, reflects a growing recognition that access to critical geospatial data cannot be left entirely to market actors. Sovereign or allied satellite systems ensure guaranteed access during crises, insulating military operations from corporate decisions, financial instability and geopolitical leverage.
At the international level, the most urgent task is establishing a Commercial Space–Conflict Treaty Regime. Drawing on the logic of naval neutrality under Hague Convention XIII of 1907, a shutter-limit framework could permit commercial providers to supply archival imagery, for instance, data older than 24 hours, while prohibiting real-time tasking that directly feeds the kill chain. This would shift wartime decisions currently made through opaque corporate discretion into the domain of predictable international legal standards, ensuring democratic oversight and strategic consistency. Complementing this, allied states must develop agreed norms around geospatial neutrality to prevent miscalculation and escalation. The restriction of imagery by Planet Labs in 2025 exposed a fundamental ambiguity: Actions intended as protective measures can be read by adversaries as direct participation in the kill chain, potentially justifying cyber or anti-satellite retaliation. Without a shared doctrine defining neutral versus hostile acts in geospatial operations, the risk of escalation driven by misperception will grow alongside the capabilities themselves.
Taken together, these measures constitute not a rollback of commercial space integration but a responsible architecture for governing it. The geospatial age of warfare is already here. The question is no longer whether to regulate the intersection of commercial satellites and armed conflict, but whether states and industry will build that architecture before the next escalation forces the issue.
Qurat-Ul-Ain Shabbir is a PhD scholar at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, and currently serves as a research officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies AJK.
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